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Empiricism about mathematical knowledge, and about what is commonly 
thought to be a priori knowledge such as knowledge of analytic truths, has 
been a distinctive and influential position, if not a dominant trend, in con- 
temporary philosophy. This global empiricism goes back, at least, to John 
Stuart Mill, whose views on knowledge of mathematics and logic are best 
characterized as 'inductivism' or 'low empiricism'. As is well known, he 
regarded mathematical truths, at least the simple ones of arithmetic and 
geometry, as low-level inductive generalizations from perceived objects and 
events which directly instantiate them. Thus, the evidential relation that 
a mathematical truth, say, '3 + 2 =  5', bears to its experiential basis is 
the same, according to Mill, as the relation that 'All ravens are black' bears 
to the observation of black ravens. Comtemporary Logical Positivists, who 
proclaimed themselves as the legitimate heirs to the Empiricist tradition 
of Hume, Mill and Mach, were never quite clear on the issue of mathematical 
and logical knowledge: their official doctrine was of course that mathematical 
truths are 'tautological' or 'analytic', arising out of  certain features of 
language, and that our knowledge of these truths, while a priori, does not 
constitute a refutation of empiricism. However, they never made clear exactly 
how these truths 'arise out of  language' or whether our knowledge of them 
depends, evidentially or otherwise, on our knowledge of language. 1 As a 
result, it is not clear why the Positivists thought that the linguistic theory of 
a priori, if it is correct, would be a defense of global empiricism. In challenging 
the concept of analyticity and the existence of a priori knowledge, Quine has 
come closer to the spirit of  global empiricism that the Positivists. His 'high 
empiricism' contrasts with Mill's inductivism in that it regards mathematics 
not as a low-level inductive science but as an integral component of  our 
holistic epistemic scheme whose evidential connection to observation and 
low-level generalizations, like that of  fundamental theoretical principles of 
physics, highly indirect. Knowledge of mathematics and logic, on this view, 
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remains broadly empirical in that nothing in the total scheme, including 
mathematics and logic, is exempt from possible reconsideration and expulsion 
under the pressure of  observation and experience. 
I do not intend to discuss Quine's views, or other similar views, in this 
paper,: but concentrate on Mill's inductivism. There is a broad consensus 
among philosophers that Mill's theory is wrong - not just wrong but wrong in 
an obvious and simplicistic way. However, I do not believe that there has 
been a clear appreciation of the reasons why inductivism about mathematics 
is wrong, and I also think that there is an important element in Mill's 
approach that is right. A detailed examination of some aspects of Mill's 
inductivism, I think, can help in placing in proper perspective recent discus- 
sions of mathematical knowledge, aprioricity, and the causal approach to 
empirical knowledge. 
I 
Let us begin by considering what Mill would say about our knowledge of a 
simple arithmetical truth, say '3 + 2 = 5'. 3 There are three elements of his 
theory that are of interest to us: 
(1) The statement '3 + 2 = 5' is not about numbers considered as 
abstract entities, for there are no such things. It is about three 
pebbles and two pebbles, three elephants and two elephants, 
and so on; that is, the statement is about objects accessible to 
our experience. 
(2) The statement '3 + 2 = 5' is inductively confirmed by its 
favorable instances - by observing that three pebbles and two 
others amount to five pebbles, and so forth, in the same way the 
observation of black ravens inductively confirms the generalization 
'All ravens are black'. That is to say, the arithmetical statement is 
an inductive generalization supported by observation of its favor- 
able instances and refuted by observation of unfavorable instan- 
ces. 
(3) Aprioricism about '3 + 2 = 5' is gratuitous. Even those who accept 
this position must grant that the statement is also confirmed 
inductively by its favorable instances, and that inductivism 
provides a sufficient account of our knowledge of this truth. 
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There is no need, therefore, to resort to aprioricism to explain 
mathematical knowledge and thereby complicate our overall 
epistemology. 
For us the second and third claims are crucial. Notice first that the second 
claim by itself is not sufficient to give us a full-fledged inductivism: for it 
is conceivable that although an arithmetic truth receives confirmatory sup- 
port from observation of favorable instances, this support is not enough to 
generate knowledge, and perhaps not enough to warrant our rational 
acceptance of it as true. A full-fledged inductivism must also show that we 
can know an arithmetical truth solely on the basis of this kind of low-level 
induction. Mill's third claim contends that this is possible: inductive evidence 
is sufficient to give us mathematical knowledge, and it is all we need in order 
to explain the possibility of mathematical knowledge. It is clear, however, 
that the second claim is more fundamental; it is pressuposed by the third, 
and without it the inductivism of the sort Mill defends cannot get started. 
A popular, and widely accepted, criticism of Mill's second claim takes the 
following form: 4 if '3 + 2 = 5' is inductively confirmable, then it must also be 
inductively disconfirmable; but it is in fact not inductively disconfirmable, 
there being no conceivable observation of pebbles, elephants, microbes or 
what have you that would make it reasonable for us to doubt its truth. We 
would always explain away any apparent discrepancy between the arithmetical 
truth and observation by casting doubt on some aspects of the observation; 
we would never impugn the arithmetical truth. This objection, however, is 
far from conclusive; it is open to the inductivist to make the following reply: 
our inability to 'conceive' compelling counterexamples to '3 + 2 = 5' is not 
due to any real metaphysical or logical impossibility (these modalities are 
suspect notions in any case), but it is to be explained psychologically in terms 
o f  the strongly entrenched position it enjoys in our epistemic scheme. Every- 
where we look, Mill says, we see simple arithmetical and logical truths 
confirmed and positively instantiated so that we become psychologically 
unable to countenance the possibility of their being false. Thus, hewing to the 
general Humean lines here, the inductivist suggests that the impossibility is 
in the eye of  the beholder, not in the nature of reality beholden; familiarity 
breeds necessity, or at least an illusion of necessity. 
Apart from this possible reply, the criticism also has the limitation that it 
leaves the epistemic role of observation of instances of arithmetical truths 
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totally unaccounted for. It is certainly plausible to think that counting 
pebbles and fingers is epistemically relevant to checking or finding out the 
sum of  3 and 2. A child who has checked this sum with pebbles or his t'mgers 
has placed himself in a stronger epistemic position with respect to '3 + 2 = 5' .  
Mill's explanation in terms of  a simple model of  induction may be wrong, but 
the situation clearly calls for an explanation. 
Another objection to Mill can be adapted from some observations Roderick 
Chisholm has made concerning our knowledge of  the relations of  exclusion 
and inclusion holding for properties such as colors, s In case o f  an enumerative 
induction confirming a generalization of  the form 'All A's are B',  if what was 
thought to be a positive instance o f  the generalization, that is, something that 
is both A and B, later turns out not to have been one -- that is, if what was 
thought to be a black raven later turns out to be a black grackle or just a 
brown shoe - then the confirmatory force of  the observation is entirely 
voided. However, in case of  the observational confirmation of  '3 + 2 = 5' this 
is not the case. If  it turns out that it was only in a dream that I counted three 
pebbles and two pebbles, or if it turns out that what I counted was not 
pebbles but seashells, that would make no difference to our enhanced 
epistemic position with respect to the arithmetical statement; it would not 
take away the confirmation that has accrued to this statement through what 
has turned out to be a case of  mistaken perception. As Chisholm puts it for 
the case of  color exclusions, "if  we happen to find our perception was unveri- 
dical, this finding will have no bearing upon the result" 6. 
I think this point is an important one, but as thus formulated there is a 
plausible initial reply to it. In the case of  'All ravens are black' and black 
ravens, if what was thought to be a black raven turns out to be a brown shoe, 
then there n e v e r  was a confirming instance. In the case of  '3 + 2 = 5' and the 
pebbles, however, if the pebbles turn out to have been seashells, this does not 
entirely void the confirming instance; for we now have, instead of  three 
pebbels and two amounting to five pebbles, a new positive instance, of  three 
seashells and two more amounting to five seashells. This explains why our 
confidence in '3 + 2 = 5' remains undisturbed. On the other hand, if what we 
thought we counted as three and two pebbles turn out to have been four and 
two (that is, if we miscounted), then this discovery would make a 
difference to our epistemic status with regard to the arithmetical statement; 
the discovery would void the increment in epistemic support accorded to the 
arithmetical statement by the mistaken counting. 
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While this reply meets the objection under discussion, there is a fundamen- 
tal point implicitly shared by both  the objection and the reply: what is impor- 
tant, and epistemically relevant, in counting pebbles or fingers to verify 
'3 + 2 = 5' is not the fact that pebbles or fingers are involved in the perceptual 
situation; it is rather the fact that the numerical properties three and two, and 
also five, are perceived to be instarttiated in a certain relationship. The arith- 
metical statement concerns these numerical properties, and whether pebbles 
or fingers or seashells instantiate them is immaterial. We will recur to this 
point below, for now, let us continue our focus on the possible differences 
between the case of  checking pebbles to verify '3 + 2 = 5' and the standard 
case of  inductive confirmation. 
In a standard case of  induction favorable instances are typically cumulat ive  
in their confirmatory effect. This is not to say that the increase in some 
numerical measure of  'degree of  confirmation'  is correlated by some simple 
function with the number of  positive instances; nor is it to deny that in 
special cases in which appropriate background information is available, a single- 
case induction may be entirely sufficient to warrant the inductive conclusion. 
The point is merely that generally speaking and everything being equal, the 
more favorable instances you have, the better  confirmed is your generaliza- 
tion, that the more often your  generalization has survived potential falsifiers, 
the stronger is the credibility that accrues to it. But this cumulative effect 
of  favorable instances seems conspicuously absent when we consider 'inductive 
confirmation'  of  arithmetical statements or logical or analytic truths. Does 
the observation of  unmarried bachelors inductively confirm 'All bachelors 
are unmarried'? It would be quite senseless to say: "Now that I have checked 
only seven bachelors - they all confirm the generalization - I had better 
check a few more just to make it really sure...". Similarly, in the case of  '3 + 
2 = 5' ,  it would be senseless to reason: "Well, now that I have checked this 
out with my  fingers, 1 should also check it out with my  toes, and maybe some 
pebbles, too,  to make it double sure. You could help out by checking it out 
with your  toes and fingers, too,. . .".  There may be a point in repeating the 
experiment by counting the fingers again, but this is to ensure that  the 
counting was done correctly, that is, to make sure that there was a 'positive 
instance'; it is not to multiply positive instances. 
This brings out another point: in a normal induction, we think it is not the 
mere number of  positive instances but the variety in the kinds of  instances 
that makes a significant impact on the credence we should attribute to a gene- 
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ralization. Thus, we should check not just the ravens in North America, but  
also sample them in South America and Asia; we should check various kinds 
of  metals, not just a large sample of  the same metal, in verifying the propor- 
tionality of  thermal and electrical conductivity in metals . Now this require- 
ment of  variety seems totally out of  place when we consider '3 + 2 = 5': if 
we counted our fingers right, and verified the relationship for these fingers, 
there is no need whatever to go to toes, nails, or flower pots. Unlike in the 
typical cases of  inductive confirmation, neither the number of  instances nor 
their variety seems to affect the epistemic relation of  '3 + 2 = 5' to its 
'positive instances'. 
I think that these two points of  difference are sufficient to indicate that 
the epistemic relationship between '3 + 2 = 5'  or 'All bachelors are unmar- 
ried' and their instances is different in nature from the inductive relationship 
holding between inductive generalizations and their instances. In fact, I 
believe it is best not to think of  the former relation as an evidential relation, 
a relation between evidence and hypothesis, or between justifying grounds 
and knowledge claim. It is better to think of  the observation involved in 
counting pebbles as a cue that prompts our apprehension of  the truth of  
'3 + 2 = 5' rather than as evidence for the truth of  this proposition. 
II 
The upshot of  our discussion thus far is that empirical observation does not 
function in case of  simple arithmetical truths like ' 3 + 2 = 5 '  in the way it 
does in case of  standard inductive generalizations. Whatever epistemic role we 
may ultimately assign to experience in relation to mathematical knowledge, 
it does not play the role of  inductive evidence to generalizations. Mill was surely 
wrong is using the modelof induct ionto  explain the epistemic role of  experience 
for mathematical knowledge. But there is one aspect of  his theory that we 
should salvage. It is this: we see in our perceptual experience three pebbles 
and two pebbles, and see also that they make up five pebbles. That is to say, 
we perceive in our experience o f  the world, perhaps also even within our 
minds, numerical or mathematical properties instantiated, and we also 
perceive certain numerical or mathematical relationships to obtain. 
If  three pebbles and two more adding up to five pebbles seems too com- 
plicated a fact to 'perceive', we may begin with a simpler example: the three 
pebbles over here are more numerous than the two pebbles over there. It could 
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hardly be contested that we see or perceive a fact of  this sort as we see or 
perceive any physical fact. Perceptual discrimination of this kind is as readily 
made, and as common in our dally life, as perceptual discrimination of any 
other sort, such as that one object is longer, larger, or heavier than another, 
that one color is greener or more saturated than another, that the green round 
spot is on top of the red triangle, and countless others. Notice also that in 
these other cases, too, mathematical properties and relations may be involved, 
though they are geometric ones such as being longer than, being round and 
being triangular. These are among the many common-sense perceptual judg- 
ments we make every day, and often make correctly; without the ability to 
make them our ability to find our way about in the world, and to survive, 
would be severely limited. It is well known, from extensive psychological 
studies, that a normal human percipient can make accurate perceptual judg- 
ments of the number of dots in random patterns flashed on a screen for a 
short time (around one-fifth of  a second) when the number is equal to or less 
than seven. 7 The number seven is important here since when more than seven 
dots are involved not only do subjects tend to make errors but they also tend 
to estimate the number rather than 'directly perceive' it, or as some experi- 
menters put it, subitize it. Animals, too, can be conditioned to respond dif- 
ferentially to colors, shapes, and numbers of  dots. 
The points I want to establish here, something that I hope will come to 
everyone as completely obvious, is this: as objects of perceptual discrimina- 
tion and judgment, there is nothing unusual, uncommon or mysterious about 
numerical properties and relations or, more generally, mathematical properties 
and relations. Seeing that something is round, that these are three green dots, 
that the dots over here are more numerous than those over there, that there 
are more dots on the screen now than just a moment ago, and so on are just 
as common, and practically and psychologically unproblematic, as seeing that 
these dots are green, the dot on the left is larger and greener than the one on 
the right, and so on. There probably are highly complex and abstract 
mathematical properties which have no significant relationships to the 
perceptual world, but it is not their being mathematical properties, whatever 
this may come to mean, that make them inaccessible to perception. Numer- 
ical properties do not differ in respect of  perceptual accessibility from sundry 
physical properties such as colors, shapes, odors, warmth and cold. They are 
among those 'sensible qualities' the Empiricists used to talk about; as may be 
recalled, number was thought to be a 'primary quality' of objects. 
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Human perception is a causal process involving the features of the object 
or situation perceived and the states of our sense organs and nervous system. 
Just as the character of our perceptual experience of there being a green dot 
is causally determined in part by the state of  affairs of there being a green 
dot, so our perceptual experience of there being three dots out there, or that 
there are more green dots than red ones, is causally determined by there 
being three green dots, or there being more green dots than red ones. Causal 
efficacy of these states of affairs involving numerical properties and relations 
are of course not limited to perceptual experience; a bomb can be rigged up 
to detonate just in case green dots outnumber red ones on the screen. Equally 
obviously, there being three green dots is a causal effect of certain antecedent 
events or actions. Like any other concrete states of affairs these states of 
affairs involving numerical properties are links in the pervasive causal 
network of this world. In this respect there is no difference between mathe- 
matical properties instantiated in physical situations on the one hand and the 
so-called physical properties on the other. If no mathematical properties are 
realized in the physical world, there would be not much reason to worry 
about mathematics. And some of these physically realizable mathematical 
properties are also perceptually accessible. 
When Mill discusses the nature of  mathematics and our knowledge of it, 
these facts about mathematical properties in relation to perception and the 
physical world are taken for granted. There is no worry about mathematical 
properties being in some sense suprasensory, supraphysical realities inacces- 
sible to perceptual processes. Mathematical properties are abundantly exem- 
plified everywhere we look, just as physical properties are, and there is no 
special mystery about our epistemic access to them. Often properties are 
said to be 'abstract universals', and thought not to exist in the concrete space- 
time world; even if one adopts this view, mathematical properties are not 
thereby made more abstract or more suprasensory than physical ones; it 
remains an open possibility that we have the same sort of  access to the for- 
mer as to the latter. 
One reason I dwell on these rather obvious points is that they appear 
to have escaped the notice of some philosophers who for the past decade 
or so have concerned themselves with the alleged problem of reconciling 
the semantics of mathematical language, which posits mathematical entities 
such as numbers, with an empiricist account of mathematical knowledge. 
The standard current source of this problem is Paul Benacerraf's 1973 paper, 
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'Mathematical Truth'. s The following passage by W.D. Hart sets forth the 
problem with admirable succinctness: 9 
But it is a metaphysical axiom that natural numbers are causally inert. So a causal condi- 
tion on mathematical knowledge seems unsatisfiable. This is the shape of the recent 
problem of platonism and the causal theory of knowledge. But there lies behind it a 
much older problem. Consider: Empiricism is the only real theory of knowledge; all the 
rest are nonstarters. Despite the failure of nerve by most classical empiricists, empiricism 
is the doctrine that all knowledge is a posteriori (analyticity and so forth were confused 
ideas). All a posteriori knowledge is justified ultimately by experience. As H. P. Grice 
argues, experience necessarily requires causal interaction with the objects experienced. 
But mathematical objects are necessarily causally inert. So platonism seems incompatible 
with empiricism. Yet platonism is the only adequate theory of mathematical truth. So 
platonism and empiricism also seem separately undeniable. 
Many issues are raised here, but I want to focus on the claim, 'the metaphy- 
sical axiom' as Hart calls it, to the effect that mathematical objects are 'causal- 
ly inert'. This is supposed to mean that such things as numbers, sets, and 
geometric figures cannot enter into causal relations, either as causes or effects. 
As a result, they are not knowable through experience, for all experience in- 
volves causal interaction with the objects experienced. 
The points I made earlier concerning our perceptual access to numerical 
and other mathematical properties can be appreciated when they are set 
against these claims and inferences presented by Hart. The principal claim 
that I want to advance in this connection in this: mathematical properties, 
including numbers, are no worse off  than such sundry physical properties as 
color, mass, and volume, in respect o f  causal efficacy. In the perceptual 
context, which is o f  primary interest to us, numbers and numerical relation- 
ships present no greater mystery or puzzles than colors and shapes. If  mathe- 
matical properties are causally inert because they are 'abstract', then physical 
properties, qua properties, are no less abstract and should be just as causally 
impotent. I f  mathematical knowledge cannot be explained on the causal 
model, then we should expect the model to be unsuited as a model of  knowl- 
edge of  physical properties as well. Conversely, if there can be knowledge of  
physical properties that is in accord with the requirements of  empiricism or 
the causal theory, that is presumptive evidence that knowledge of  mathematical 
objects meeting the same general requirements must also be possible. At any 
rate, the inference we must resist is 'Abstract; therefore, causally inert; there- 
fore, unperceivable and unknowable' .  Our case against this inference depends 
fundamentally on two points: first, this inference applies to physical proper- 
ties with equal force, leading to absurdities; second, our perceptual access to 
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numerical and other mathematical properties and relations is in fact very 
much like our perceptual access to physical properties and relations. 
It may be objected that the present approach construes numbers as proper- 
ties of  sets or classes, and that these entities themselves are abstract entities in- 
capable of entering into causal relations. The force of  saying that something is 
'abstract' or 'platonic' has never been made clear. One sense sometimes at- 
tached to 'abstract' is that of 'eternal': an abstract object in this sense neither 
comes into being nor perishes. Another closely related sense is that of  not be- 
ing in space and time. Abstract entities in this sense are atemporal and non- 
spatial; they lack location in space-time. A third sense is that of  'necessary'; 
abstract entities in this sense are said to 'exist necessarily'. It is by no means 
obvious that these three senses are equivalent; for example, one traditional 
concept of God makes him abstract in the first and third sense but not in the 
second. 
It is only the second sense of 'abstract' which may exclude abstract entities 
from causal relations. Spatio4emporal contiguity is one of the conditions laid 
down by Hume as necessary ingredients in the causal relation. Although direct 
contiguity in space-time is not required for noncontiguous causation, causally 
related objects must be in some definite spatio-temporal relationship to each 
other. How else could one explain why an object, which is qualitatively indis- 
tinguishable from a second, does not causally interact with a third while the 
second does? Abstract objects in the sense of  lacking in all spatio-temporal 
properties including locations seem logically incapable of entering into causal 
relations. 
The line of  argument we are considering here, namely that since sets are 
not spatio-temporal objects, they cannot be perceived, strikes me as a lame ob- 
jection. If ascribing a numerical property to these dots on the paper, that 
they are five in number, is to have the consequence that we are attributing a 
property to some suprasensible object in the platonic realm, inaccessible to 
human perception, then something is wrong with the descriptive apparatus 
being used, and it is this apparatus, and the metaphysical assumptions that 
underlie it, that need to be changed, and not our belief that the number five 
is visibly instantiated by these dots right in front of  us. More specifically, 
there is first of all the possibility of attributing numerical properties not to 
sets but to physical aggregates or mereological sums, a possibility that has re- 
cently been worked out by Kessler. 1~ Second, the metaphysical assumption 
that sets or classes are abstract in the present sense is by no means obvious 
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or compelling. That is, it is not clear why we should not say that the class o f  
these dots, as well as the dots themselves, is right here on this piece of  paper, 
that this class came into existence when little Johnny made the dots with his 
ballpoint, that  it moves when the piece of  paper is moved, and that it goes 
out o f  existence when the paper is burned to ashes in the fireplace. What pre- 
cisely is the reason for consigning this class to the platonic realm accessible 
only to 'intellectual insight'? It might be said that what I have in mind here is 
the mereological sum which has the five dots as its parts but not the set o f  
these five dots. But whether  mereological sums are concrete (if all o f  their parts 
are) and whether sets of  classes are abstract are questions that are to be an- 
swered not by looking at some preexisting matter  o f  fact about sets or sums 
but by making conventional decisions. I f  we take mathematical theories of  
sets as definitive of  the concept of  a set or class, they have nothing to say a- 
bout  the abstractness or concreteness of  sets, and nothing about their spatia- 
lity or temporality.  That all sets are abstract, that  they are all nonspatiotem- 
poral, that they cannot admit o f  changes in their membership, and so on are 
philosophical doctrines more often taken for granted than explicitly and open- 
ly argued. 11 Perhaps some sets are abstract and some are concrete. Perhaps 
sets are concrete if their members are concrete and abstract if  their members 
are abstract.12 
So 1 stand by my  claim that we perceive this collection of  five dots and 
that  class o f  three, and also perceive that the first is more numerous than the 
second. It is open to us to adopt the language of  mereological sums if neces- 
sary; but 1 want to stress that there is no compelling reason to think that the 
set-theoretical language is ruled out because of  the alleged abstractness of  sets. 
Thus, there is no reason to think that we cannot say both  that  natural num- 
bers are properties of  sets, and that we have perceptual access to some sets 
and their numerical properties. 
It is perhaps useful to point out that the claim is not that all mathematical 
properties, or even all natural numbers; are perceptually accessible. Just as 
not all physical properties are perceptually accessible - there are the so-called 
' theoretical properties '  - only some mathematical properties are accessible in 
our perceptual experience. What epistemological role these perceivable mathe- 
matical properties plays vis-~-vis those that are not perceivable is a question 
that still needs to be addressed, and we can expect it to share points o f  similar- 
ity with the much debated problem about the relation between 'theoretical 
terms'  and 'observational terms'  in philosophy of  science. The possibility 
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exists that neither of these questions is a particularly useful or illuminating 
way to study the epistemological issues in the respective areas; what needs to 
be noticed is simply that the situation is symmetric, in interesting respects, as 
between mathematical and physical knowledge. 
I I I  
We concluded earlier that Mill was wrong about the nature of the epistemic 
relation between our knowledge that 3 + 2 = 5 and our seeing that three fin- 
gers and two more add up to five. Whatever it is, the relationship is not one of 
inductive confirmation, the relation that inductive evidence bears to the gene- 
ralization it supports. What then is it? I am not ready to offer a theory here; I 
shall instead present some considerations and suggestions that may go some 
way toward adumbrating the shape of an account that better fits with the 
facts to be explained. Let us begin with a closer look at Chisholm's theory of 
'intuitive induction'. 
Although Chisholm does not discuss numerical examples, the kind of 
numerical examples we are concerned with will come under his 'intuitive 
induction'; at any rate it is instructive, I believe, to think of these cases of 
apprehending simple arithmetical truths on the model of intuitive induction. 
We are in agreement with Chisholm's negative conclusion: intuitive induction 
differs in kind from the usual varieties of induction in that in the former ob- 
served instances do not serve as evidence or justification for the conclusion; 
they serve merely as an 'occasion' ~3 for our coming to know the conclusion. 
We said that the observation functioned as a 'cue' to trigger our apprehension 
of the conclusion, and this is putting the same point in a slightly different 
way. According to Chisholm, 14 intuitive induction has four distinguishable 
stages: (1) the perception of individual things (a red dot, a green dot; three 
fingers, two fingers, etc.); (2) abstraction of general features or properties 
from the perceived individual objects (color red, green; three, two, etc.); (3) 
an intuitive apprehension of certain relationships holding between these pro- 
perties (that red 'excludes' green; that three and tw'o makes five); (4) the further 
apprehension that the relationships apprehended hold necessarily. 
Chisholm's description makes one thing clear; the reason why particular 
observed instances are of no evidential significance is that their work has been 
completed, and they drop out of the picture, once the subject has reached the 
second stage by making proper abstractions. Once proper general concepts 
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have been acquired, their causal origins do not matter: for all we know, they 
may have been implanted in our minds by the Evil Genius or some sort of  in- 
jection or radiation, although of course in these cases no intuitive induction 
would have taken place. Notice, further, that Chisholm does not claim that all 
relations holding for the abstracted concepts can be intuitively apprehended; 
some would have to be apprehended, if at all, through a long and complex 
process of  inference. The claim is that there are some significant relations be- 
tween the abstracted features which can be directly and intuitively apprehen- 
ded, and that these can serve as 'axioms 'as to generate further truths about 
these entities. I believe we can add that this procedure of inference and con- 
struction can generate not only new truths but also new concepts: thus, the 
familiar foundational scheme emerges for both truths and concepts. What 
such generative processes might be like in detail and whether truths and con- 
cepts thus generated will suffice to explain the whole of mathematical know- 
ledge are the important questions that will need to be discussed. 
Returning to Chisholm's intuitive induction, we must observe that there is 
at least one respect in which the four stages discerned by him do not accommo- 
date our numerical examples. When we count our fingers to figure out what 
the sum of three and two is, the main point of  the exercise is not to abstract 
out the numerical properties three, two, and five. In a typical case of  this 
kind, we are already in possession of the requisite concepts: that is why we 
are able to count to three, two, and five. The point of  the exercise is to ascer- 
tain whether a certain relationship holds among these numbers. It is perhaps 
possible, at least for some of us, intuitively to apprehend that the sum of 
three and two is five, without counting fingers or pebbles, once we have the 
three numbers. But this is not the point; the point is rather that in the case 
under consideration, the counting does seem to aid in an essential way the 
intuitive apprehension, at Chisholm's stage (3), of  a relationship holding 
among these numbers. 
There seems to be various ways that can be tried to accommodate the nume- 
rical examples of  this kind within the Chisholmian scheme; one obvious way 
would be to revise Chisholm's stage (3) to make room for certain kinds of  
perceptual constructions like counting and the drawing of figures to check 
geometric relationships; another would be to leave Chisholm's scheme as 
it is for 'basic' concepts and 'axioms' and try to work out a role for per- 
ceptual constructions in the process of inference leading from these basic 
concepts and axioms to more complex concepts and derived truths. Which- 
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ever route is taken, the guiding idea is that the role of perception is that of a 
causal cue of a certain kind, not as justificatory evidence, for the a priori 
truths apprehended through its aid. It is what triggers the human cognitive 
mechanism into appropriate action, and given the particular sort of cognitive 
apparatus that humans are genetically endowed with, certain types of percep- 
tual stimuli may in fact be causally necessary to generate a priori knowledge. 
It is useful to compare these reflections with Plato's doctrine of recollec- 
tion, 16 a theory that most philosophers would now consider a mere curiosity. 
Briefly, Plato's claim was that all our knowledge is prenatal, and that what we 
take to be a process of acquiring knowledge is really a process of recollecting 
the knowledge we previously had but have forgotten. In spite of his well- 
known disparagement of the senses as a source of knowledge, Plato appears to 
assign, in this doctrine, an indispensable role to sense-perception: the disembo- 
died soul, unencumbered by the demands of the body, can contemplate the 
Forms directly, and apprehend their relationships intuitively and with cer- 
tainty; however, as  embodied beings, we must be prompted by appropriate 
perceptual cues in order to recollect. It seems, therefore, that the role of 
sense-perception in Plato's theory of recollection is akin to its role in Chis- 
holm's theory of intuitive induction; in both, its role is not to provide evi- 
dence but to function as 'occasion' or 'trigger'. 
In a recent article i7 Philip Kitcher has worked out a detailed analysis of a 
priori knowledge following the classical model of priori as that which is 'inde- 
pendent of experience'. Kitcher's analysis is based on the reliability approach 
rather than the traditional approach in which the concept of justification 
plays the central role, but what is of interest to us is the general picture of 
human knowledge and, in particular, of a priori knowledge that his analysis 
presents. Knowledge is thought of as the output of the cognitive mechanism 
which is genetically built into us and which develops and matures partly as a 
matter of biological process and partly as a result of the sensory input applied 
to it. A priori knowledge is that part of its output which is independent of 
the specific sensory input in the sense that the output is invariant with re- 
spect to the particular input applied as long as there has been a sufficient 
amount of it to generate the concepts needed for the formulation of the pro- 
positional output. The similarity between Kitcher's account of the role of 
sensory input in the generation of a priori knowledge and Chisholm's treat- 
ment of observation as an element in intuitive induction is evident. In both 
accounts the chief role assigned to sensory input is to generate the requisite 
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concepts,  and it is only in this way that  a priori knowledge 'depends on ex- 
perience' .  Once the appropriate  concepts are on hand,  a priori knowledge will 
be produced by  the cognitive mechanism regardless of  the character and 
quant i ty  of  the sensory input that  happens to be provided. The l imitat ion I 
pointed out  earlier in Chisholm's .model in handling numerical examples 
seems to apply also to Kitcher 's  analysis: sensory input  may have an epis- 
temic role to play beyond that o f  providing raw material out  o f  which the 
requisite concepts are developed. There are many significant differences 
between Chisholm's and Kitcher 's  accounts,  as may be expected from the 
fact that  whereas Chisholm's general approach is largely tradit ional  Kitcher 's  
is that  of  'naturalized epistemology' .  What this cursory comparative look at 
Plato 's  doctrine o f  recollection, Chisholm's account o f  intuitive induction,  
and Kitcher 's  analysis of  a priori indicates is that  each o f  these diverse ap- 
proaches is compatible with the conception of  the epistemic role of  perception 
for a priori knowledge that  I have tried to delineate in this paper. The sub- 
stantive task o f  analysis and theory construction remains. My project here 
was to mark out  a direction in which further work in this area may fruitfully 
p roceed )  8 
The University of Michigan 
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language or propositional knowledge about a language. 
2 For a good discussion of the Quinean approach to a priori see Adam Morton, A guide 
Through the Theory of Knowledge (Dickenson, Endocino, Calif., 1977), ch. 8. 
3 For Mill's views, see: A System of Logic, Book II, esp. chs. 5, 6, and 7. 
4 See, e.g., Carl G. Hempel, 'On the nature of mathematical truth', reprinted in P. 
Benacerraf and H. Putnam (eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Mathematics (Prentice- 
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964). For interesting recent defenses of Mill's general 
position, see Glenn Kessler, 'Frege, Mill, and the foundations of arithmetic', Journal 
of Philosophy 77 (1980), pp. 65-79; Philip Kitcher, 'Arithmetic for the Millian', Philo- 
sophical Studies 37 (1980), pp. 215-236. 
s Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977), cli. 3. 
b Theory of Knowledge, p. 39. 
See, e.g., E.L. Kaufman et al., 'The discrimination of visual numbers', American 
Journal of Psychology 62 (1949), pp. 498-525. 
Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973), pp. 661-679. 
9 Review of Mark Steiner, Mathematical Knowledge, Journal of Philosophy 74 (1977), 
pp. 124-125. 
354 J A E G W O N  KIM 
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11 For a discussion of  some of  these issues, see Kit Fine, 'Modal set theory '  (forthco- 
ming in NoOs). The only argument that  I can think of  against giving spatio-temporal 
locations to sets would run as follows: " I f  the set o f  those dots  is located on this piece 
of  paper where the dots  are located, there are many other sets that must be located at 
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would then have the result that  an infinite number of  distinct physical objects is located 
on this spot ."  I don ' t  see why some technical conventions about locating sets would not  
adequately solve this problem. 
1~ In a recent article, 'Perception and mathematical intuit ion'  (Philosophical Review 89 
[1980], pp. 163-196) ,  Penelope Maddy makes much the same claims that  I make in this 
paragraph, although I had not  had the opportuni ty  to read this article when the present 
paper was written. See especially page 179 of  her paper. There are other  interesting 
points in her paper that  are echoed in this paper,  but  the general epistemological thrust 
o f  her views is different from mine. See also in this connection the  interesting paper 
by Michael Resnik, 'Mathematical knowledge and pattern cognition' ,  Canadian Journal 
o f  Philosophy 5 (1975), pp.  2 5 - 3 9 .  
13 Chisholm, Theory o f  Knowledge, p. 39. 
14 Op. cit., p. 38. 
15 On Chisholm's notion of  'axiom',  op. cir., pp.  41ff. 
16 The primary sources are the Meno and the Phaedo. 
17 'A priori knowledge' ,  Philosophical Review 89 (1980), pp. 3 - 2 3 .  
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